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1. Introduction 
As part ofthe effort to reform Hong Kong's laws in light ofChina's resumption 
of sovereignty on 1 July 1997， dramatic changes have recently been made to 
Hong Kong bankruptcy law. The Hong Kong Bankruptcy (Amendment) 
Ordinance 19961 (the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance) was enacted in 
December 1996， les than seven months before Hong Kong became a Special 
Administrative Region of China. This Ordinance makes the first comprehen-
sive changes to Hong Kong bankruptcy law in over a century and will affect 
the insolvency of both individual debtors and partnerships.2 The Ordinance 
amends or replaces much of the Hong Kong Bankruptcy Ordinance3 (the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance)， which is based on English legislation dating back to 
the 1880s. The new Ordinance is expected to come into operation later in 1997 
after the new Bankruptcy Rules are drafted. 
The Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance is the fruition of insolvency law 
reform that began in September 1990 when the ChiefJustice and the Attorney-
General requested the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong to conduct a 
review of both bankruptcy and liquidation law and practice in Hong Kong. 
The Law Reform Commission appointed the Sub-Committee on Insolvency， 
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1. Order No. 76 of 1996. As of 10 July 1997， the 
Ordinance had not yet come into operation. 
2. ln Hong Kong， the insolvency law of individ-
uals is separate from that of companies. The 
former is called bankruptcy law and is 
contained in the Bankruptcy Ordinance (cap 
6)， Laws of Hong Kong (LHK) (1997)， and 
the latter is called liquidation law and is 
contained in the Companies Ordinance (cap 
32)， LHK (1997). Hong Kong partnerships 
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may be made bankrupt under the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance， but a Hong Kong partnership 
with eight or more partners may instead be 
wound up as an “unregistered company" 
under Part X of the Companies Ordinance. 
3. Cap 6， LHK (1997). Although the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Ordinance has not yet come 
into operation， inthis article its provisions are 
referred to as the “new lawぺand the 
provisions to be replaced as the “old law". 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (1997) 
184 INSOL International li削 olvenり Review
under the Chairmanship of Professor ELG Ty1er. The Sub-Committee com-
menced work on 12 November 1990， and issued its Consultative Document 
on Bankruptcy in August 1993.4 The Law Reform Commission circu1ated 
this consultative document for comment by interested professiona1 bodies and 
others. After reviewing the submissions， the Law Reform Commission pub・
lished its final recommendations for bankruptcy law reform in its Report on 
Bankruptcy in May 1995.5 The Commission's recommendations， with a few 
notable exceptions，6 adopted the proposals of the SuかCommittee on 
Insolvency. Most of the Commission's recommendations， in turn， were 
incorporated into the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Bill7 and then into the 
Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance. Interestingly， both the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Bill and the enacted Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance 
included some additional changes to the law that were not raised in either the 
Consultative Document on Bankruptcy or the Report on Bankruptcy.8 
In conducting its review ofHong Kong bankruptcy law， the Sub-Committee 
on Insolvency considered the bankruptcy law and bankruptcy law reform 
efforts in many other jurisdictions， including England and Wales， Scotland， 
Singapore， New Zealand， and Australia. Both the Sub-Committee and the 
Law Reform Commission relied heavily on the recommendations of the Report 
of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice in England and 
Wales9 (the Cork Report)， many of which were incorporated into the UK  
Insolvency Act 1986. They also benefited from the recommendations of the 
Law Reform Commission of Australia10 (the Harmer Report). Hong Kong 
often incorporates UK statutory provlslOns into Hong Kong law， and the 
Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， in great part， continues this practice. 
However， the new Ordinance also includes some provlslOns from other 
countries， aswell as some new local provisions that cater to conditions in Hong 
Kong. 
The problems with the old 1aw have become more apparent given the 
increasing number ofbankruptcies in Hong Kong. For example， from 1994/95 
to 1995/96， the number of bankruptcies jumped 53.5 per cent from 325 to 
499.1 This increase was directly related to the weakness in Hong Kong's 
4. The Law Reform Commission qf Hong Kong Sub-
Committee on Insolvency， Consultative Document on 
Bankrψ1り (August¥993) (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong Government Printer， 1995) 
5. The Law Reform Commission qf Hong Kong， Report 
on Bankruptcy (May 1995) (Hong Kon宮Govern-
ment Printer， 1993) 
6. See， e.g. the Law Reform Commi回ion's
discus則 nof the juris吋di仁t
vin宮thepresen仁εofassets， ibid. at paras 2.12 
2.36， at 23-29， and of the reJation back 
doctrine， at paras 14.5-14.13 at 134--137. 
7. Bankruptcy (Amendment) Bill 1996， Legal 
Supplemmt No.3 to the Hong Kon.~ Government 
Gaとete，1 March 1996 
lnt. Insolv. Rev.ぅ Vol.6: 183 209 (1997) 
8. See e.g. the changes to the trustee's avoid-
ance powers -Bankruptcy (Amendment) 
Ordinance， s.36 (substituting new 5 49-51B 
in the Bankruptcy Ordinance). 
9. lnsolvency Law and Practice，- Report 01 the Revieuノ
Committee (Cmnd 8558， 1982)， under the 
Chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Cork， CBE. 
10. The Law Reform Commission 01 Australia，-General 
I問。lvencylnquり， Report No.45 (1988)， Mr 
R W Harmer， Commissioner-in-charge 
1. Hong Kong O.ficial Receiv，引な O.fice Annual 
Dψartmental Rψort 1995-96 (1996) (Hong 
Kong Government Printer， 1996)， Annex 6 
(for the year 1 April 1995 to 31 March 1996) 
F or the past 10 year5 the n um ber of 
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economy at that time and the relatively high unemployment. As reported by 
the 0伍cialReceiver， the leading causes of the 499 bankruptcies in 1995/96， in
order of importance， were the following: liabilities incurred on personal 
guarantees; a drop in business; cash-flow problems -insu伍cient capital; 
excessive use of credit facilities; loss in investment; and lack of gainful employ-
ment.12 The leading factor involving personal guarantees probably follows 
from the financial di伍cultiesexperienced by Hong Kong companies. This is 
because management and ownership functions in Hong Kong are generally in 
the hands of the same individuals， and it is quite common for directors of 
Hong Kong companies to guarantee their companies' debts. Thus， when a 
Hong Kong company experiences financial problems， the bankruptcy of the 
company's directors often follows. 
Although the Hong Kong real estate market and economy have recently 
improved， it is likely that the number of bankruptcies will remain high， atleast 
for the new few years. 1 t remains very expensive to operate a business in Hong 
Kong， and the price of real estate is again on an upward spiral.I3 Weaker firms 
will be unlikely to survive in this environment. Earlier this year， both Hongkong 
Bank and Hang Seng Bank announced dramatic increases in their bad debt 
provisions -a 123 per cent increase at Hongkong Bank to HK$1.44 bil1ion and 
fivefold increase at Hang Seng Bank to HK$715 million.14 Households are 
again spending dangerously high levels of their household income to service 
their mortgagesl5 and credit card interest rates are “excruciatingly high'¥16 
Once the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance comes into operation， a 
growing number of individuals who are unable to cope with such financial 
pressures will probably file for bankruptcy to take advantage of the liberalised 
discharge provisions (discussed in Part X1V below). 
This article presents an overview of the important changes to Hong Kong 
bankruptcy law made by the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance. 1t also 
discusses some ofthe trends and policy changes that emerged during the reform 
process and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the new legislation. 
bankruptcy cases has been as folows: 378 
in 1986/87; 292 in 1987/88; 194 in 1988/89; 
178 in 1989/90; 226 in 190/91; 294 in 191 
92; 313 in 1992/93; 318 in 1993/94; 325 in 
1994/95; and 499 in 1995/96. It should be 
noted， however， that even at these recent high 
levels of bankruptcy， the rate stil remains 
lower than in other countries (para. 1.2， at
p.I). 
12. Ibid. Annex 13. 
13. Se “Local experts propose action on soaring 
property pricesヘBBCSummary of World 
Broadcasts， Part 3， Asia-Pacific (Xinhua news 
agency， 10 July 197); Philip Segal，“Asian 
Real Estate: No Firm Ground"， International 
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Herald Tribune， 8 March 1997， p.17. 
14. Deborah Orr，“HSBC reveals surprise pro-
visions"， South China Morning Post， 4 March 
1997， p. 1. 
15. Segal， op. cit.， n 13. 
16. Se Jane Moir，“Credit card rates ‘excruciat・
ingly high' "， South China Morning Post， 16April 
1996， p. 3 (citing consumer chiefs). For further 
discusion of factors likeiy to incrでasethe 
number of insolvenci田 inHong Kong， se 
Charles D Booth，“Living in Uncertain Times: 
The Need to St陀 ngthen Hong Kong 
Transnational Insolvency Law" (196) 34 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 389， at
435-438 
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11 . Grounds for presenting a bankruptcy petitio目
The changes to the grounds for presenting a bankruptcy petition incorporate 
one of the most far-reaching changes in the new law -the abolition of the 
concept of “acts of bankruptcy". This concept， which can be traced back to 
early English statutes enacted in the Middle Ages，17 requires that a debtor must 
commit an “act of bankruptcy" before creditors are allowed to petition for the 
debtor's bankruptcy.恥10stof the "acts of bankruptcy" listed in old s. 3 of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance set out various types ofwrongful conduct by a debtor， 
e.g. making a fraudulent conveyancel8 or removing one's property from Hong 
Kong with the intent to defeat or delay one's creditors.19 Many of the acts of 
bankruptcy， such as beginning“to keep house"， are archaic and are rarely 
relied upon by creditors. In spite of the many possible acts of bankruptcy 
specified in the Bankruptcy Ordinance， probably 95 per cent of bankruptcy 
cases are commenced by creditors relying on a debtor's failure to comply with 
a bankruptcy notice under old s. 3 (1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance戸
The aim of the Law Reform Commission was to enact new grounds for 
presenting a bankruptcy petition that would be better utilised by creditors in 
Hong Kong. The new grounds will be as follows: (i) a debtor's failure to comply 
within three weeks with a statutory demand for the repayment ofHK$lO，OOO 
or more;21 (i) a debtor's failure to satisfy an execution of a judgment debt for 
HK$lO，OOO or more;22 (ii) the absconding of a debtor (or the intention to 
abscond by a debtor) from Hong Kong and the “debtor knows or ought 
reasonably to know that his departure would result in defeat or delay for his 
creditors";23 and (iv) a debtor's default in connection with a voluntary arrange-
ment.24 The first three grounds have their origins in the former acts of 
bankruptcy， and the fourth ground refiects changes to the law to facilitate 
“workouts" for debtors. 
The enactment ofthese grounds and the abolition ofall but one ofthe acts of 
bankruptcy that were premised on wrongful behaviour by the debtor demon-
strate that bankruptcy will come to be based more on the poor financial state of 
a debtor rather than on a debtor's actions. This is an appropriate policy shift 
which acknowledges that bankruptcy is 0白encaused by a debtor's financial 
incompetence or mistakes， rather than by morally blameworthy behaviour. 
Although society as a whole benefits from the growing availability of credit， 
individu 
17. Se Act Against Such As Do Make Bankrupt， 
34 and 35 Henry VIII， Chapter 4 (1542); 13 
Eliz， Chapter 7 (1571) 
18. Bankruptcy Ordinance， old目 s.3(I)(b)
19. Ibid， s.3(1)(d) 
20. Consultative Document on Bankruptcy， 
op. cit.， n.4， para. 2.13， atp. 10. 
21. Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s.4 
(substituting new s 6 and 6A(I)(a)， (2) in 
the Bankruptcy Ordinance) 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (197) 
2. Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s.4 
(substituting new s 6 and 6A( 1) (h) in the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance). 
23. Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s.4 
(substituting new s.6(4) in the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance) 
24目 Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s.4 
(substituting new s. 3(1)(c) in the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance); and s.13(substituting new s.20L 
in the Bankruptcy Ordinance. 
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and then default on their consumer debts， while others invest at the wrong time 
and get hurt by a stock market or real estate crash. 
However， the Law Reform Commission has not based the new grounds solely 
on the financial di伍cultiesof a debtor， because it has inc1uded a ground based 
on the absconding of a debtor or the intention of a debtor to abscond. The 
Sub-Committee on Insolvency was aware of reported instances of absconding 
debtors in the run-up to 1997 and was troubled by reports of debtors incurring 
substantial debts that they had no intention of repaying.25 
The new grounds borrow much from UK  law. In particular， grounds (i) and 
(i) are adopted from s 267 and 268 of the U K  Insolvency Act 1986， and 
ground (iv) from s 264 and 276. The new amendments also bring Hong Kong 
bankruptcy law into sync with the current practices in the Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance26 (the Companies Ordinance) for use in compulsory 
liquidations. First， the period of statutory demand has been increased from one 
to three weeks.27 Secondly， a statutory demand will no longer have to be based 
on a judgment.28 (This change will save creditors unnecessary expense and 
time and enable them to commence bankruptcy earlier.) Thirdly， the language 
in new s.6A( 1) (b) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance regarding unsatisfied 
executions parallels the language in s. 178(b) of the Companies Ordinance. 
The abolition of the notion of “acts of bankruptcy" should be welcomed. 
However， as the Cork Report has noted: 
“[t]he elimination of the doctrine of the act of bankruptcy .. is not merely a 
question ofmodernising and simplifying the grounds upon which a creditor may 
initiate insolvency proceedings. It represents a fundamental change in the law of 
bankruptcy with far-reaching consequences."29 
These consequences may be seen in other amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance such as the abolition of the concept of“relation back" (discussed in 
Part XI below) and in the changes to the jurisdictional requirements. 
11. Jurisdiction of the court 
Certain jurisdictional criteria must be satisfied to ensure that a debtor has 
su伍cIentcontacts and a geographical connection with Hong Kong to justify 
25. Consultative Document on Bankruptcy， 
op. cit.， n. 4， para. 2.19， atp. 12. 
26. Cap 32， LHK (197). 
27. Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s.4 
(substituting new s.6A(I)(a) in the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance， which tracks the 
three-week period in s. 178 of the Companies 
Ordinance). However， new s.6C of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance provides that a petition 
may be presented before the expiry of the 
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three-week period “if there is a serious 
posibility that the debtor's property or the 
value of any of his property wil be signifi-
cantly diminished during that period and the 
petition contains a statement to that efect'¥ 
28. This folows from the deletion of the old 
s. 3 (1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance by 
S目 4 of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) 
Ordinance. 
29. Cork Report， op. cit.， n. 9， para. 530， atp. 126. 
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his bankruptcy in Hong Kong. U nder the old scheme， which is based on the 
notion of acts of bankruptcy， jurisdictional criteria have to be satisfied at the 
time of the occurrence of an act of bankruptcy30 and in the case of a creditor's 
petition at the time that (or， for some of the factors， within one year before the 
date on which) the bankruptcy petition is filed.31 Section 4 ofthe Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Ordinance repeals the twofold approach of the old regime and 
replaces it with a new s.4， which is based on s.265 of the UK  Insolvency 
Act 1986: 
“(1) A bankruptcy petition shall not be presented to the court .. unless the 
debtor一
(a) is domiciled in Hong Kong; 
(b) is personally present in Hong Kong on the day on which the petition is 
presented; or 
(c) at any time in the period of 3 years ending with that day一
(i) has been ordinarily resident， or has had a place of residence， in 
Hong Kong; or 
(i) has carried on business in Hong Kong. 
(2) The refere町 ein su b-section ( 1 )(c) to a de btor carrying on business 
includes -
(a) the carrying on ofbusiness by a firm or partnership ofwhich the debtor 
is a member; and 
(b) the carrying on ofbusiness by an agent or manager for the debtor or for 
such a firm or partnership." 
These new jurisdictional criteria increase the relevant period of residency 
and carrying on of business from one to three years. Domicile， residence or the 
carrying on of business in Hong Kong on the date of the bankruptcy filing， 
provides a clear jurisdictional connection between a debtor and Hong Kong. 
Although residence or the carrying on of business within the prior threてyearperiod 
does not demonstrate as clear a connection， the inclusion of these criteria is 
justified by the need to gain jurisdiction over absconding debtors who run up 
debts in Hong Kong， but then flee from Hong Kong with their assets.32 By 
giving the courts bankruptcy jurisdiction over such individuals， these criteria 
enable a bankruptcy trustee to begin a search for assets and to seek recognition 
abroad for the Hong Kong bankruptcy. Bankruptcy orders issued in cases 
involving absconding debtors who have emigrated and no longer reside or 
carry on business in Hong Kong would be enforceable in the United Kingdom 
under s. 426 of the UK  Insolvency Act 1986. Howevεr， in other jurisdictions， 
it is arguable that enforcement would not be given as the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in Hong Kong would not be the primaヮbankruptcyproceeding. The 
30. Bankruptcy Ordinance， old s. 3(2). 
ヲ1.Ibid， old s.6(I)(d) 
lnt. InsolD. ReD.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (197) 
32. Se Fletcher and Crabb， InsolDency Act 1986 
(Current Law Statutes Annotated， 1986)，451 
265 at pp.45-216. 
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primary proceeding would more likely be in the jurisdiction in which the 
debtor was domiciled or， perhaps， had his primary residence.3 
The jurisdictional factor based on personal presence is the weakest criterion 
because it enables the court to enter a bankruptcy order against a person who 
might have only a tenuous connection with Hong Kong， such as a short-term 
tourist or an in-transit passenger. However， pursuant to new s.5(3) of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance (which is modelled on s. 266(3) of the UK  Insolvency 
Act 1986)， the court has the discretion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition or to 
stay proceedings on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. It must also be 
kept in mind that the inclusion of the personal presence criterion will “catch" 
persons who do not satisfy the definition of residency， but who have never-
theless run up unpaid debts in Hong Kong. 
U nfortunately， the Law Reform Commission rejected the recommendation 
ofthe Sub-Committee on Insolvency that the presence ofassets should also be a 
jurisdictional criterion.34 This omlSSlOn leaves a gap in the law that is of 
importance in cross-border insolvencies -assuming that none of the other 
jurisdictional criteria are satis白ed，a foreign debtor might have assets in Hong 
Kong that are beyond the reach of a foreign trustee， yet also outside the scope 
of Hong Kong bankruptcy law -which will work to the advantage of fast-
moving creditors and to the disadvantage of unsecured creditors generally.35 
IV. Minimum debt and statutory deposit 
The minimum debt upon which a creditor may petition for a debtor's bank-
ruptcy has been raised from HK$5，OOO to HK$lO，OOO.36 The HK$5，OOO level 
was introduced into legislation in 1976. Given the high inflation rate in Hong 
Kong， HK$5，OOO in 1976 would be equivalent to more than three times that 
amount today. Thus， the increase to HK$10，OOO seems reasonableY In addi-
tion， the Law Reform Commission found that the higher amount was more in 
line with the minimum debt level in England and Wales and Australia.38 
Raising the minimum debt to HK$lO，OOO will have litle e百ecton the ability 
of most creditors to petition， given that creditors rarely petition for less than 
that amount anyway39 (at least in part because ofthe statutory deposit require-
ment， which is discussed below). Although the increased minimum debt might 
hinder the ability of employees to petition for the bankruptcy oftheir employers， 
3. For further discusion of these cros-border 
insolvency isues， se Charles D Booth，“The 
Transnational Aspects of Hong Kong 
Insolvency Law" (195) 2 Southwestern ]ournal 
01 Law and Trade in the Americas 1 at78-79 
34. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， paras 
2.12-.36， atpp.23-29. 
35. For funher discusion of this isue and for a 
more complete critique of the Law Reform 
Commission's position， se Booth， op. cit.， 
。1997John Wiley & Sons， Ltd 
n. 16， atpp.426-429. 
36. Se Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s.4 
(substituting new s. 6(2) (a) in the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance) . 
37. New s.6(5) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance wil 
enable the Financial Secretary to increase the 
amount to keep pace with inflation. 
38. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， paras 
3.5-.6， at p. 3 
39. Ibid.， para. 3.9 at p. 34. 
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such employees will remain protected by s. 16 ( 1 ) (a) of the Protection of Wages 
on Insolvency Ordinance，40 which enables the Commissioner for Labour to 
make ex gratia payments from the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund to 
employees in cases in which a bankruptcy petition may not be filed against 
their insolvent employers solely because the minimum debt cannot be met. 
Raising the minimum debt level is in keeping with the rationale that bank-
ruptcy law should generally be dependent on a debtor's inability to pay， as it 
protects the debtor against petitions based on smaller claims that the debtor 
might well be able to pay back over time. If a debtor believed that he could not 
repay debts that amounted to les than HK$10，000， he could always file a 
voluntary petition for which there is no minimum amount.41 
One reason why raising the minimum debt level by HK$5，OOO will have 
litle effect on the number ofbankruptcy cases is that the petitioner must make 
a statutory deposit with the Official Receiver to cover the preliminary expenses 
ofthe case. Under Bankruptcy Rule 52(1)，42 upon the presentation ofa bank-
ruptcy petition the petitioner must deposit HK$11，250 with the 0伍cial
Receiver. Further， under Bankruptcy Rule 52(1)， the court may direct the 
petitioner to deposit additional sums to cover the fees and expenses to be 
incurred by the Official Receiver. 
The Law Reform Commission has recommended that the statutory deposit 
be reduced to HK$5，000 for both creditors and debtors.43 This change will 
probably be reftected in the new Bankruptcy Rules. The current level came into 
effect in 1996， replacing the level set in 1985 when the deposit was raised by 
1，000 per cent from HK$1 ，000 to HK$10，OOO. The 1985 increase was part of a 
deliberate policy to restrict the number ofbankruptcy petitions， which proved at 
least partly successfu1.44 By now lowering the statutory deposit， the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Ordinance will undo the e旺ectof this earlier change. As the Law 
Reform Commission has noted，“Recourse to bankruptcy proceedings should 
be within the financial reach of as many people as possible . . ."戸
The recommendation of the Law Reform Commission to set the statutory 
deposit at HK$5，000 strikes a reasonable compromise -it will make petitioning 
for bankruptcy more a百ordablefor creditors， yet stil enable the Official 
Receiver (who usually serves as the trustee) to cover the initial expenses and 
costs. In cases in which further de 
40. Cap 380， LHK (1997). 
41. See Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s. 7 
(substituting new s. 10(3) in the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance)， which contin出 sthe prior policy 
42. Cap 6， sub leg A， LHK (1997). 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (1997) 
43. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para.4.13， at p.39. 
4. Ibid.， para.4.8， at p. 38 
45. Ibid.， para. 4.10， atp.38. 
46. Ibid.， para. 4.14， at p. 39. 
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V. Bankruptcy orders 
Another major change to existing law is the replacement of a two-step 
procedure -involving the entering of a receiving order and then the making of 
an adjudication order -with a one-step procedure involving the making of a 
single bankruptcy order. The theory behind the two-step procedure was that it 
provided the debtor with a period in which he could either pay his creditors in 
ful or enter into a scheme of arrangement or composition with themY In 
practice， however， such settlements have been rare， and the entering of a 
receiving order is usually followed by the making of an adjudication order.48 
Debtors and creditors should both benefit from the one-step procedure and 
its related changes. Because the scheme of arrangementfcomposition provisions 
have been replaced with a voluntary arrangement scheme (discussed in Part VI 
below) ， debtors will have better prospects for repaying their debts out of 
bankruptcy，49 and creditors will probably receive higher recoveries.50 If 
bankruptcy does result， creditors will also benefit from the lower costs and from 
the earlier appointment of a trustee. 
A one-step bankruptcy procedure will also track the existing one-step 
procedure for company liquidations. The enactment of this one-step procedure 
has led to an amendment regarding the stay of actions and proceedings， which 
will also track the company law provision. Old s. 12 (1) of the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance provides that upon the making of a receiving order， no creditor with 
a provable debt may commence any action or other legal proceedings against 
the debtor， except with the leave of the court. Section 8 of the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Ordinance amends s.12(1) so that it cor町 spondsto s. 186 of the 
Companies Ordinance and explicitly stays the commencement ofboth new and 
existing actions and proceedings upon the making of the bankruptcy order. 
A continued weakness in the provisions regarding stays is the retention of the 
policy of generally not affecting the rights of secured creditors. The Law 
Reform Commission was of the view that the rights of secured creditors should 
not be a長 ctedby the making of a bankruptcy order， except in regard to rights 
to the debtor's family home (discussed in Part X below).51 Although this 
restriction should be wekomed， it is unfortunate that the Commission failed to 
recommend that the rights of secured creditors should be stayed generally. 
Such a reform would have been to the benefit of both de 
47. Ibid.， para. 5.7， atp.42. 
48. Se ibid.， paras 5.7-5.8， atp. 42. 
49. Se ibid.， para. 5.10， atp.39. 
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51. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para目 5.12，at p. 43. 
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1986， gives the court the power to annul the bankruptcy order under certain 
conditions and ameliorates some of the harsher aspects for debtors that are 
contained in old s. 33 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. 
VI. Individual voluntary arrangements 
As noted above， the practice in Hong Kong has been that an adjudication 
order generally follows the making of a receiving order， since by the time 
the bankruptcy petition has been filed it is too late for a debtor to negotiate 
a settlement with his creditors. One of the most important aspects of the 
new bankruptcy law is the adoption of an individual voluntary arrange-
ment procedure that is based on Part VIII of the UK  Insolvency Act 1986. 
This procedure enables a debtor to seek relief at an earlier stage of his 
financial di侃cultiesand thereby avoid the commencement of a bankruptcy 
case. 
Section 13 of the bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance includes new 
s.20(2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance， which will enable debtors to seek the 
entering of an interim order that will provide the debtor with a moratorium -
during the period in which the order is in effect， no bankruptcy petition may 
be presented or proceeded with against the debtor and no other proceedings， 
execution， legal process， or distress52 may be commenced or continued against 
the debtor except with the leave of the court. As in bankruptcy， however， the 
moratorium will not affect the rights of secured creditors to realise their 
security. In addition， pursuant to new s. 20F(3) ofthe Bankruptcy Ordinance， 
secured creditors are required to consent to any proposed voluntary arrange-
ment that a百ectstheir rights. Thus， secured creditors， in e百ect，have veto 
power over any proposed voluntary arrangement. This protection for secured 
creditors seems unnecessary， indeed undesirable， inthose cases in which it can 
be proved that the interests of secured creditors are protected by the proposed 
voluntaryarrangement.53 
Although the voluntary arrangement procedure will be most useful to 
debtors who wish to avoid bankruptcy， it will also be available to undischarged 
bankrupts.54 In such cases， the court will have the discretion to annul the 
bankruptcy order. 
A complete analysis of the voluntary arrangement procedure is outside the 
scope of this article， but it is important to note that the availability of the 
voluntary arrangement procedure 0汀ersdebtors a realistic opportunity to 
avoid the harsh consequences ofbankruptcy and ofthe related disqualifications 
52. Bankruptcy Ordinance， new s. 20(2). Compare 
UK Insolvency Act 1986， s. 252(2) (not includ-
ing a prohibition against distress). 
53. For example， see s 1129(b)(I)， (b)(2)(A) 
and 1325(a)(5) of the US Bankruptcy 
Codぞ (United States Banl口 upt仁y Re仏rm
Int. ln.wlv. R即， Vol. 6目 183-209(1997) 
Act of 1978， Pub L No.95-598， 92 Stat 
2549 (codified as amended in I1 USC 
(1997)， in scattered sections of 28 USC 
(1997)， and in scattered sections 01' other 
titlcs) 
.54. Bankruptcy Ordinance， new s. 201 
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that follow， such as the restriction against serving as a company director 
without the leave of the court.55 Unsecured creditors are also likely to recover 
more in voluntary arrangements than they would in bankruptcy， ashas been 
the experience in the United Kingdom.56 
VII. The role of creditors and the truste 
The new amendments make many changes to the law regarding the balance of 
responsibilities between the trustee and the creditors. The Official Receiver 
serves as the trustee in almost al bankruptcy cases in Hong Kong.57 
Historically， creditors in Hong Kong have been reluctant to play a major 
role in bankruptcies and， inmany cases， the creditors' lack ofinterest has made 
it di伍cultfor the quorum requirements for creditors' meetings to be satisfied. 
In such cases， the Official Receiver has been forced to take extra time and 
effort to comply with the bankruptcy procedures. To address these problems， 
the 0伍cialReceiver proposed that the bankruptcy procedures should be 
streamlined and that he should be given the discretion to dispense with various 
meetings and requirements. Both the Sub-Committee on Insolvency and the 
Law Reform Commission supported these recommendations.58 The result has 
been the enactment of a variety of provisions and proposed bankruptcy rules 
along the lines of the provisions in the UK Insolvency Act 1986 and the related 
UK Insolvency Rules 1986.59 
One of the primary changes made by the Bankruptcy (Amendment) 
Ordinance， based on s 293 and 294 of the UK  Insolvency Act 1986， is that the 
Official Receiver has been given the discretion to cancel unnecessary meetings 
and to decide whether to serve as the bankruptcy trustee. Until the enactment 
of the recent bankruptcy reforms， the primary issue to be resolved at the first 
meeting of creditors was whether the debtoc should be adjudicated bankrupt 
or whether a composition or scheme of arrangement should be accepted by the 
creditors.60 Now that the receiving order and the adjudication order have been 
consolidated into a single bankruptcy order， the primary reason to hold the 
first meeting of creditors has been removed. Thus， new s. 17 A( 1) requires the 
O伍cialReceiver to decide (in cases not involving a summary administration of 
the bankrupt's assets under s. 112A of the Bankruptcy Ordinance) as soon as 
practicable within 12 weeks from the date of the bankruptcy order， whether or 
not to call a first meeting of creditors for the purpose of appointing a trustee of 
5. See Companies Ordinance， s. 156. 
56. See Sealy and Milman， Annotated Guide to the 
I町 o/venり Legislation(4th edn， 1994)， p.313: 
general comment on Part VIII of the UK 
Insolvency Act 1986. 
57. For example， between 1959 and 1992， the 
O伍cialReceiver served as trustee in al but 
four cases (Annual Dφartmental R，ψort qf the H ong 
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Kong Registrar General (1991-1992) (Hong Kong 
Government Printer， 1992)， para. 108， atp. 40. 
58. See， e.g. Consultative Document on 
Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.4， Chapter 9， at 
pp.60-65; Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， 
n.5， Chapter 8， at pp.67-72. 
59. (SI 1986/1925) 
60. See Bankruptcy Ordinance， old s. 17 (1). 
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the bankrupt's estate. If the Official Receiver does not call such a meeting， he 
becomes the trustee of the debtor's estate， and must give notice to al creditors 
of his decision.61 New s. 17B， in turn， allows creditors to request the 0伍cial
Receiver to hold a meeting for the purpose of selecting a trustee， and the 
O伍cialReceiver must summon such a meeting if the request appears to be 
made with the concurrence of not less than one-quarter， in value， of the 
bankrupt's creditors. 
The Law Reform Commission recommended other changes to stream-
line the meetings' procedures. For example， the Commission found it wasteful 
to continue r，εqUlrmg the “creditors' committee" (the new name for the 
“committee of inspection")62 to meet on a monthly basis， as is the policy 
pursuant to old s.24(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. The Commission 
therefore recommended that the first meeting of the committee be held within 
three months of the trustee's appointment， or of the establishment of the 
committee， whichever is later.63 In addition， the Commission proposed that 
subsequent meetings be held when determined by the trustee or， ifso requested， 
bya member ofthe committee or as specified by the creditors' committee.64 The 
Commission also recommended that the quorum for meetings of creditors be 
reduced to one creditor present or represented at a meeting.65 These changes will 
probably be reflected in the new Bankruptcy Rules. 
Although recommending many changes to streamline the practices regarding 
the creditors' committees and creditors' meetings， the Law Reform Commission 
was cognisant of the need to enable creditors to participate in the bankruptcy 
process. For example， the Commission refused to recommend the adoption of 
the UK practice of not appointing a creditors' committee where the 0伍cial
Receiver serves as the trustee. It noted that since the Official Receiver serves as 
the trustee in most bankruptcies， adoption of this provision “would effectively 
mean that creditors' committees would cease toαist".66 Moreover， several of 
the amendments to the Bankruptcy Ordinance increase the control ofboth the 
court and unsecured creditors over the trustee. For example， new s.61 of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance includes three additional powers for which the trustee 
must seek the permission of the creditors' committee before taking action.67 
New s. 61A， in turn， provides that “[t]he exercise by the trustee of the powers 
conf 
61. Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s.1 
(substituting new s.17A(3)， (4) in the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance). 
62. Se Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance 
(amending Bankruptcy Ordinance， s.24). 
63. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n. 5， 
para.9.1O， at p. 78 (basing this recommen-
dation on r. 6.153 ofthe UK Insolvency Rules 
1986). 
lnt. I1町 olv.Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (197) 
64. Report on sankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para. 9.10， atp. 78. 
65. Ibid.， para.8.14， atpp.70ー71(basing this 
recommendation on r.12.4A of the UK  
Insolvency Rules 1986). 
6. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para.9.15， atp. 79. 
67. Se Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， 
s.41. 
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respect to any exercise or proposed exercise of any of those powers". 68 Finally， 
amendments based on s. 304( 1) of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 were made to 
s.84 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance which， as noted by the Law Reform 
Commission， go “some way towards imposing a statutory duty on trustees in 
providing that a trustee may be liable for his actions in the event that he 
behaves improperly" in several defined circumstances.69 
The Law Reform Commission also made several recommendations that 
liberalise the treatment of creditors. For example， the Commission recom-
mended that agreement of members of the creditors' committee to a resolution 
may be obtained by post， which will avoid the necessity of calling a meeting.70 
Similarly， the Commission recommended that members of the creditors' 
committee should be capable of being represented by any person in possession 
of a letter of authority， rather than requiring that that person hold a general 
proxy or power of attorney， as is the practice under old s.24(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance.71 This practice has been repealed by s.15 of the 
Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance. 
Many of these amendments and recommendations strike a reasonable 
balance between streamlining the bankruptcy process and increasing the discre-
tion of the Official Receiver (or trustee) on the one hand， and facilitating the 
involvement of unsecured creditors on the other. However， there are a few 
exceptions， such as cancelling the first meeting of creditors， which unfortun-
ately demonstrate that improving efficiency was ultimately a more important 
goal than increasing creditor participation. 
The onus will now be on the creditors to contact each other and to seek 
support if they wish to request the 0伍cialReceiver to hold the first meeting， 
and it is possible that the views of minority creditors who cannot meet the one-
quarter in value requirement will be ignored.72 A further consequence of this 
change is that it might become more difficult to gain foreign recognition and 
enforcement in cases in which， over the objection of minority creditors， the 
O伍cialReceiver does not hold a first meeting of creditors.73 
In addition， some of the new time periods are too generous to the 0伍cial
Receiver or trustee. The 0伍cialReceiver should only be given four rather than 
12 weeks from the date of the bankruptcy order to decide whether or not to 
hold the first meeting of creditors. Similarly， it would seem appropriate that 
t 
68. Ibid.， s.42. 
69. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para.9.33， at pp.84-85. See Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Ordinance， s.46. 
70. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5.， 
para.9目13，at p. 79. 
71. Ibid.， para.9.11， at p.78. This change wilI 
probably appear in the new Bankruptcy Ru1es. 
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72. This concern， infact， was raised by a minority 
in the Sub-Committee on Insolvency. See 
Consultative Document on Bankruptcy， op. 
cit.， n.4， para. 9.13， atpp.63-64 
73. For further discussion of this issue， see Booth， 
“Recent Developments in Hong Kong 
Bankruptcy Law Reform" [1993] 2 IIR 120 
at 138-139. 
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whichever is later， rather than within three months as has been proposed by 
the Law Reform Commission. 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the future independence of the civil 
service in post-handover Hong Kong， a more fundamental objection can be 
made against increasing the discretion of the Official Receiver as to whether to 
serve as the trustee， as well as against decreasing the quorum for creditors' 
meetings. 1n short， during this period of transition the Official Receiver's role 
in bankruptcies should be decreased. To achieve this goal it would be best to 
decentralise the insolvency process -for example by appointing more private 
trustees and allowing unsecured creditors to play a greater role in their 
selection -and to ensure generally that unsecured creditors are more actively 
involved in the bankruptcy process. Thus， creditor meetings should be required 
to involve more than one creditor. 
Unsecured creditors would be more likely to participate in bankruptcies if 
there were strong incentives to increase their participation， such as an improved 
likelihood of receiving greater dividends. 1n fact， s. 36 of the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Ordinance does just this by providing a trustee with improved 
and more powerful avoidance powers (discussed in Part XVII below) that are 
modelled on s 339 to 342 of the UK 1nsolvency Act 1986. With these improved 
weapons in his arsenal， a trustee will be more likely to undo prior transactions 
entered into by the debtor， and thereby increase the size of the estate available 
for distribution. It is likely that creditors will take greater intεrest in those cases 
in which trustees exercise these new powers. Thus， it might well turn out that it 
was unnecessary to enact some of the changes that are premised on poor 
creditor participation. 
VIII. Statement of afairs 
The Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance makes severa1 changes to the law 
regarding the statement of a百airsthat will abolish the ine伍cientprocedures 
that the 0伍cialReceiver must follow at present. The old law requires the 
debtor to file the statement of affairs within seven days of the receiving order in 
cases commenced by a creditor，74 and within three days in cases commenced by 
the debtor himself.1s New s. 18(1) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance sets a more 
realistic time-limit of 21 days of the bankruptcy order in cases commenced bya 
creditor， and new s. 10(2)陀 qui陀 sthe debtor to file the statement of affairs 
with the petition when petitioning for his own bankruptcy.76 Given that the 
debtor is aware ofhis financial position at the time he files the petition， it seems 
74. Bankruptcy Ordinance， old s. 18(2)(b). 
75. Ibid.， old s. 18(2) (a). 
76. See Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s
12 and 7， respectively. These enactments track 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6・183-209(1997) 
the rτquirements in s. 288( 1) (regarding 
creditors' petitions) and s.272(2) (regarding 
debtors' petitions) of the UK Insolvency Act 
1986. 
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reasonable that he should share this information with the Official Receiver at 
that time. 
The Law Reform Commission recommended two other changes to stream-
line the procedures regarding statements of a町airs.The first was to give the 
O伍cialReceiver the discretion to dispense with the statement of affairs in cases 
where he considers it unnecessary， without having to apply for an order of the 
court as is presently required under Bankruptcy Rule 81A.77 The second was to 
give the 0伍cialReceiver the power to extend the time for submission of the 
statement of affairs without having to file a certificate in court， as is currently 
required under Bankruptcy Rule 82.18 These changes should soon appear in 
the amended Bankruptcy Rules. 
In addition， new s. 18(4) ofthe Bankruptcy Ordinance has been enacted to 
clarify the guidelines regarding a bankrupt who commits contempt of court. 79 
The new wording explicitly requires the bankrupt to submit a proper statement 
of affairs. Section 18 (4) tracks the language of s. 288 (4) of the UK Insolvency 
Act 1986. 
IX. Public and private examination 
Examinations arで animportant means for the trustee and the creditors to 
gather information about the debtor's financial situation and to discover the 
whereabouts of his assets. Public examinations involve examinations of the 
debtor; private examinations usually involve examinations of third parties， but 
may also involve examinations of the debtor. 
The presumption under old s. 19 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance is that the 
public examination should be held， although old s. 19A enables the 0侃cial
Receiver to make an application to dispense with the examination. In practice， 
however， holding a public examination is the exception rather than the rule; of 
the more than 2，600 cases in which a receiving order was made between April 
1983 and March 1994， a public examination was held in only 53 cases.80 New 
s. 19 (1) ref1ects this reality and changes the presumption -the public examina-
tion will only be held pursuant to an application by the 0伍cialReceiver.81 
New s. 19(2) and (3)， in turn， requires the Official Receiver to apply for an 
examination pursuant to a request from a creditor with or without the 
concurrence of not les than one-quarter in value of such creditors. However， 
where les than one-quarter in value of the creditors concurs， the court has the 
discretion to decline to direct that a public examination be held. 
77‘ Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， paras 
¥0.13-¥0.15， atpp.90-91. 
78. Ibid.， paras 10.16-10.17， atp. 91. This change 
would track the requirements in s.190(3) of 
the Companies Ordinance. 
79. See Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， 
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para. 11.2， atp.94. 
81. See Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， 
s.13 (substituting new s.19 in the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance). 
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1n its report， the Law Reform Commission discussed in some length the issue 
of a debtor's self-incrimination at a public examination and noted that the 
application of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights82 and of recent Hong Kong case-
law now prohibits a bankrupt's answers to questions at his public examination 
from being used against him if he has already been charged with or convicted 
of a criminal 0百ence.83The Commission also noted that allowing bankrupts to 
decline answering questions at public examinations would enable bankrupts to 
conceal their assets.84 Thus， new s.19(9) and (10) requires a bankrupt to 
answer al questions put to him， but his answers may not be used as evidence 
against him in criminal proceedings other than for perjury. 
N ew s. 19 (5) provides that the 0伍cialReceiver， the Official Petitioner 
(where a criminal bankruptcy order has been made against the debtor)， the 
trustee， a special manager， or any creditor who has submitted a proofmay take 
part in the public examination. New s.19(6)， inturn， wiU enable a bankrupt at 
his own expense to employ legal representation at the public examination. New 
s. 19(7) provides that the bankrupt wi1l have the right either to be read or to 
read the record of the examination， and s. 19 (8) provides the court with the 
discretion to order that the costs of an examination be borne by creditors who 
required a public examination in those cases where the court finds that the 
examination was “frivolous or vexatious". This standard is an improvement 
over the lower standard recommended by the Sub-Committee on 1nsolvency.85 
Private examinations are a powerful investigatory tool because theyenable 
the trustee to question third parties about the bankrupt， his dealings or 
property， and， as recently provided for in amended s.29(3)， on “any other 
matter the court considers relevant" .86 The ability of a trustee or the 0伍cial
Receiver to hold a private examination of a third party might well lead a 
bankrupt to volunteer information that such other individuals would be品rced
to provide. New s.29(lA) provides that a third party respondent may be 
required to submit an affidavit“containing an account ofhis dealings with the 
bankrupt or to produce any documents in his possession or under his control 
relating to the bankrupt or the bankrupt's dealings， affairs or property". These 
changes are based on s. 366( 1) of the UK  1nsolvency Act 1986. 
New s.29(3A) and (3B) provides that every per 
82. Hong Kong Bil of Rights Ordinance 
(cap 383)， LHK 197. 
83. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， paras 
1.5-1.7 at p. 96-97. 
84. Se ibid.， paras 11.13-11.17， atp.98. 
85. Se the Consultative Document on Bankruptcy， 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (197) 
op. cit.， n.4， para. 12.3， at p. 96 (proposing a 
standard of whether the court considerモdit 
“unnecessary， on the evidence of the questions 
asked， tohave held the examination") 
86. Se Bankruptcy (Amcndment) Ordinance， s. 19 
(amending s. 29 ofthe Bankruptcy Ordinance)目
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may order the individua1 to pay the debt in ful or in part， or to deliver the 
property or any part thereof to the 0伍cia1Receiver or the trustee. This 
changes the practice in old s. 29(4) and (5)， which requires that for the court to 
make such an order the individual must first admit that he is indebted to the 
debtor or that he has in his possession property. The precedent for amended 
s.29(4) and (5) is s. 31 (4) and (5) of the Singapore Bankruptcy Act 1888.87 
The Law Reform Commission recommended the adoption of this provision 
rather than the related provision in s. 367 (1) and (2) of the UK  Insolvency Act 
1986， because the UK  provision appears to enable a court to order any person 
to pay a debt or deliver property to the official receiver as a result of 
information obtained in the examination of another party.88 
A further amendment related to the private examination is new s. 30D， 
which enables the court to order the Commissioner of Inland Revenue to 
produce various tax documents of the bankrupt.89 Section 30D is based on 
s.369 of the UK  Insolvency Act 1986. Curiously， unlike its UK  counterpart， 
s. 30D is not applicable to a public examination of a bankrupt. 
x. The bankmpt's prope此ydivisible among creditors 
The old provisions regarding the bankrupt's property divisible among creditors 
are among the most outdated provisions in the Bankruptcy Ordinance. Old 
s.43 provides that the bankrupt is entitled to retain goods of a value of 
HK$3，OOO， inclusive of his tools of trade and necessary wearing apparel and 
bedding of himself and his dependants. In practice， the trustee usually ignores 
the limitation.9o N ew s. 4391 is based on s. 283 of the UK  Insolvency Act 1986. 
U nder new s. 43 (2)， the HK$3，OOO limitation has been removed and a bank-
rupt will be entitled to retain: 
“(i) such tools， books， vehicles， and other items of equipment as are necessary to 
the bankrupt for use personally by him in his employment， business， orvocation; 
(i) such clothing， bedding， furniture， household equipment and provisions as are 
necessary for satisfying the basic domestic needs of the bankrupt and his 
family.'岨
Another important aspect of new s.43 is the ab01ition of the outdated 
doctrine of “reputed ownership". This doctrine held that “if the debtor 
appeared to be in possession of property which secretly belonged to another， 
87. Se Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para.12.16， at p.ll. 
8. Ibid.， paras 12.17-12.18， atp.1I1. 
89. SeeBankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s. 21目
90. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
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that would boost his creditworthiness， and t出her陀efor陀ehis creditors should be 
entitled to treat that property as part of the bankruptピ'se白state".9 
Given t出ha剖tthe new eαxemptions of prope町rt町yare much broader than in old 
s.43， s.43B s叩et“sfor口ththe procedure to enable the trustee to recover certain 
items of excess value. Another change to the law is in s.43A， which provides 
that property which the bankrupt acquires post-petition does not vest in the 
trustee unless the trustee serves a notice in writing so to claim the property. 
(Previously， al post-petition property vested in the trustee， which proved 
administratively cumbersome.94) New s.43C prescribes the time-limits on the 
trustee for recovering property under new s. 43A and B. New s. 43D， in turn， 
provides that， notwithstanding s. 43 to 43B， the bankrupt or any creditor may 
apply to the court to include or exclude any particular item from the estate. 
Other notable changes to the law include the enactment ofnew s. 43E， which 
authorises the court， on the application of the trustee， to make “an mcome 
payments order" pursuant to which the bankrupt must pay to his estate a 
portion ofhis income for the period in which the order is in effect. 1n addition， 
s. 43F entitles the bankrupt to continue his occupation of the family home for a 
period ofsix months from the time ofthe making ofthe bankruptcy order， and 
in exceptional circumstances for a further period of six months. Finally， 
amended s. 61 (a)95 provides that a trustee (with permission of the creditors' 
committee) may allow a bankrupt to restructure his business where such 
restructuring is in the interests of the creditors. 1n so doing， amended s.61 
further provides that the trustee “may permit the debtor to retain any 
leasehold interest in property in which his business is situated". 
These amendments greatly improve the law and strike a better balance 
between the interests of a bankrupt and his creditors. Under the new pro-
visions， a bankrupt will be better able to provide for the basic domestic needs of 
himself and his family， but trustees and creditors will be able to ensure that the 
bankrupt does not benefit unjustly from the post岨 petition acq uisi tion of 
property and earnings. 1n addition， allowing a bankrupt to retain his tools of 
trade etc.， aswell as to restructure his business， might well enable him to repay 
a higher percentage of his debts. Finally， the provision entitling the ba 
93. Sealy and 孔1ilman，op. cit.， n.56， p.346目
general 
Act 1986 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (1997) 
94. See Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para目 13.51at p. 130. 
95. See Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s. 41. 
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unmatured life insurance contracts or the right to receive unemployment 
benefits， alimony， or pension benefits.96 
XI. Relation back of the truste's title 
Related to the concept of acts of bankruptcy is the notion that the commence-
ment ofa debtor's bankruptcy has relation back to the occurrence ofthe act of 
bankruptcy upon which a receiving order is made (or， where the debtor has 
committed more than one act， tothe earliest act ofbankruptcy within the three 
months before the filing ofthe petition). The debtor's bankruptcy is deemed to 
commence at that date， and the debtor's property also vests in the trustee as of 
that date. This enables a trustee to overturn transactions to the detriment ofthe 
estate that were entered into by the debtor from that date onward.97 The Law 
Reform Commission recommended that the doctrine of relation back be 
retained in an “adapted" version， and recommended a period of three 
months preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition.98 In contrast， the Sub-
Committee on Insolvency recommended the abolition of the doctrine.9 
Section 30 of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， which substitutes 
new s.42 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance， rightly adopts the views of the Sub-
Committee. 1 t isbased on s. 284 of the UK  Insolvency Act 1986， pursuant to 
which certain post-petition dispositions of the bankrupt may be recovered by the 
trustee. 
XII. Prof of debt 
Many amendments have been made to s. 34 ofthe Bankruptcy Ordinance that 
improve the guidelines for provable debts.1o Section 34( 1) has been amended 
to allow proofs of debts for unliquidated tort claims to be admitted in bank-
ruptcy. This important change in Hong Kong bankruptcy law abolishes the 
archaic distinction between unliquidated contract claims (which have been 
allowed) and unliq uidated tort claims (which have not). These changes reflect 
the views of the Cork Report: 
“1 t isa basic principle of the law of insolvency that every debt or liability 
capable of being expressed in money terms should be eligible for proof in the 
insolvency proceedings， so that the insolvency administration should deal 
comprehensively with， and in one way or another discharge， al such debts and 
liabilities." ¥0 1 
96. Se US Bankruptcy Code， s.52 
97. Se the Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
paras 14.2-14.4， at p. 133-134. 
98. Ibid.， para.14.10， atp.136 
9. Consultative Document on Bankruptcy， 
⑥ 197 John Wiley & Sons， Ltd 
op. cit.， n.4， para.15.16， atp.129. 
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101. Cork Report， op. cit.， n.9， para. 1289 (quoted 
in the Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
Para.15.5， atp. 140). 
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Of course， the law must provide a mechanism for valuing unliquidated 
claims. Amended s. 34(4) provides that the trustee should either (a) make an 
estimate of the value of the debt or liability or (b) refer such debt or liability to 
the court for valuation. Section 34(7)， in turn， provides that the court “may 
direct the value to be assessed before the court itselfwithout the intervention of 
a jury". It is unfortunate that the recent amendments do not set forth a more 
comprehensive valuation procedure.102 
The new legislation also includes provisions addressing issues involving 
claims in foreign currency and currency conversion matters. New s.34(3B) 
requires that the value of foreign currency debts should be determined by 
converting the amount of such debts into a Hong Kong dollar equivalent as of 
the date of the making of the bankruptcy order. This will change the existing 
practice， which has been to convert foreign currency debts as of the date of the 
receiving order.103 
New s.34(3C) permits the trustee to pay dividends in respect of foreign 
currency claims either in Hong Kong dollars or in the foreign currency 
equivalent of Hong Kong dollars. When payment is made in the foreign 
currencyequivalent， the amount of the dividend is to be determined by using 
the conversion rate as of the date of the payment of the dividend. 
A third change to the law regarding foreign currency appears in new 
s. 61 (k)， 104which permits the trustee (with the permlsslOn of the creditors' 
committee and after taking expert advice) to delay conversion of foreign 
currency into Hong Kong dollars. This change will provide the trustee with 
ftexibility when dealing with assets in foreign currencies.105 
New s. 34(3A) provides that no government fine or monetary penalty will be 
admissible to proo王Suchfines and penalties will thereby not be released by the 
bankrupt's discharge.106 This was also the recommendation of the Cork 
Report，107 which， in turn， was incorporated into UK  insolvency law.108 This 
amendment changes the current treatment of such debts in Hong Kong， 
because although the Bankruptcy Ordinance has not provided that fines and 
penalties are provable， the practice has been that they are.109 The incorporation 
of this new provlSlon reftects the policy that the discharge should only be 
applicable to claims of the “honest but unfortunate debtor，10 and not to 
102. For a discusion of a proposed alternative 
valuation procedure， se Booth，“Recent 
Developments in Hong Kong Bankruptcy 
Law Reform"， [193] 2 IIR 120， at 146-147 
103. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para. 15.7， atp. 140. 
104目 SeBankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， s. 41. 
105. For a more detailed discusion of the amend. 
ments relating to foreign currency claims， se 
Booth，“The Transnational Aspects of Hong 
Kong Insolvency Lawヘop.cit.， n.33， at 
pp.74-76. 
106. Se s.23 of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) 
1nt. 1n.fOlv. Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (197) 
Ordinance (suhstituting new s.32(5) in the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance). 
107. Op.cit.， n.9， para.1330， atp.302 (cited in 
Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n. 5， 
para. 15.3， at p. 146) 
108. Se UK Insolvency Rules 1986， r. 12.3(2); UK 
Insolvency Act 1986， s. 281 (4) 
109. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para. 15.29， at p. 145. 
110. Local Loan Co v Hunt 292 US 234， 244 (193) 
(quoted in Baird and Jackson， Cases， Problems 
and M aterials on Bankゆり (2ndedn， 190)， 
p.81O). 
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penalties or fines that have been incurred by the debtor as punishment for his 
wrongful behaviour. 
Finally， new s. 34(7 A) provides that the trustee must accept or reject a proof 
of debt within a period， prescribed by the rules， or such longer period as the 
court may allow. This amendment is intended to ensure that the trustee admits 
claims within a reasonable time. II 
XIII. Declaration and distribution of dividends 
Amendments have been made to s. 67 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance regarding 
the declaration and distribution of dividends.12 Old s.67 requires， as a rule， 
that the first dividend be declared and distributed within four months of the 
first meeting of creditors with subsequent dividends being declared and 
distributed at intervals not exceeding six months. The 0伍cialReceiver has 
found these guidelines to be impractical and recommended the adoption of the 
approach of s. 324( 1) of the UK  1nsolvency Act 1986， which abolishes the 
imposition of a time frame.13 These changes have been incorporated into new 
s. 67 (1)， which provides as follows: 
“Whenever the trustee has su侃cientfunds in hand for the purpose he shall， 
subject to the retention of such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the 
bankruptcy， declare and distribute dividends among the creditors in respect of 
the bankruptcy debts which they have respectively proved." 
XIV. Discharge 
The amendments regarding the discharge of bankrupts are among the most 
important changes included in the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance.14 
Although it is true that old s. 30 set out procedures providing for the discharge 
of bankrupts， in practice， bankruptcy has been a “life sentel1ce" for most 
bankrupts in Hong Kong.1J5 For example， in the 10・yearperiod from 1983 to 
1992， o111y 25 ofroughly 2，400 bankrupts were discharged.J16 The old require-
ments for discharge have clearly become insurmountable for the vast majority 
of bankrupts. 
The new discharge provisions， which incorporate aspects from both UK  and 
Australian law， reflect the modern trend to enable most bankrupts to emerge 
from bankruptcy with a “fresh start" after a reasonable period of time. 1n the 
111. Se定 Reporton Bほnkruptcy，op. cit.， n.5， 
paras 15.52-15.55， at p.15l. 
12. S町 Bankruptcy(Amendment) Ordinance， 
s.43. 
13. Se Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n. 5， paras 
16.4← 16.5， atp. 154. 
I!;J 197 John Wiley & Son8， Ltd 
14. Se Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance， 
s.20 (substituting new 8 30-30C in the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance). 
15. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n.5， 
para.17.l， at p. 156. 
116. Ibid.， para. 17.8， atp.16l. 
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case of a person not previously adjudged bankrupt， new s. 30A(2) (a) provides 
for the automatic discharge of the bankrupt at the end of four years from the 
date of the making of a bankruptcy order. In the case of a person who has been 
previously adjudged bankrupt， s.30A(2)(b) delays the discharge for an addi-
tional year. However， s.30A(3) provides that the date of discharge may be 
extended for specified periods in cases in which the trustee or a creditor raises 
a valid objection pursuant to new s. 30A( 4). These objections incorporate 
parts of the Australian Bankruptcy Act 1966 and the Australian Bankruptcy 
Amendment Act 1991. Among the objections which may be raised are the 
following: that a first-time bankrupt is likely within five years of the date of the 
bankruptcy order to be able to make a significant contribution to his estate; 
that the bankrupt's discharge would prejudice the administration of his estate; 
that the bankrupt has failed to co・operatein the administration of his 
estate; that the bankrupt's conduct has been unsatisfactory; that the bankrupt 
has departed from Hong Kong and仏iledto comply with a request by the 
O伍cialReceiver or trustee to return to Hong Kong; that the bankrupt has 
continued to trade after knowing that he was insolvent; that the bankrupt has 
committed a bankruptcy 0汀ence;and that the bankrupt has failed to prepare 
an annual report for the trustee. 
New s.30A(9) provides that a bankrupt who receives a discharge may be 
required to continue contributing to his estate for up to eight years from the 
date of the bankruptcy order. New s.30B allows bankrupts to apply to the 
court for an early discharge. In essence， the harshness of the former discharge 
regime has been replaced with a new regime that offers attractive inducements 
for bankrupts to co・operate(e.g. the automatic discharge or an early discharge) 
and serious repercussions for bankrupts who fail to co・operate(e.g. the白lingof 
objections by the trustee or creditors， which are likely to result in a delay in the 
making of the discharge). 
Transitional provisions have also been included in the recent amendments to 
remedy the situation of the thousands of bankrupts in Hong Kong who have 
been adjudicated bankrupt under the old bankruptcy law. Ncw s. 30C of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance provides， as a rule， that individuals who have been 
bankrupt for four years or more (or five years or more in the case of individuals 
who have previously been made b 
XV. Statutory undertakings 
Although the Bankruptcy Ordinance has been silent as to whether utility 
companies arc required to supply services to bankrupts in Hong Kong， in 
practice utility companies co・operatewith bankruptcy trustees and do not 
demand payment of pre-petition charges as a precondition to supplying the 
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trustees with services.1I7 New s.30E of the Bankruptcy Ordinance formalises 
this practice for the public suppliers of gas， electricity， water and telecommuni-
cations when dealing with the 0伍cialReceiver， a trustee in a bankruptcy， 
or a nominee in a voluntary arrangement. 1 18 This、sectionalso enables the 
suppliers to require the trustee or nominee to guarantee personally the pay-
ment in respect of new charges incurred during the bankruptcy or the 
voluntary arrangement. 
XVI. Interest on debts 
Matters involving interest on debt are dealt with by s. 71 of the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance. This section is also applicable in company liquidations pursuant to 
s. 264 of the Companies Ordinance. The Law Reform Commission had 
intended to amend old s. 71 later in the reform process， and only decided to 
incorporate recommendations into its Report on Bankruptcy after receiving 
submissions from practitioners seeking an urgent amendment to this section.1 19 
The problem in old s. 71 has been the provision in subs. (1) which limits interest 
on debts bearing interest to eight per cent per annum up to the date of the 
receiving order. In compulsory liquidations， the limitation applies up to the 
date of the filing of the liquidation petition. 120 This restriction causes especially 
serious problems in company liquidations. As the Law Reform Commission 
noted， when a bank is wound up， this provision requires the liquidator to 
recalculate the interest on any account with an interest rate greater than eight 
per cent. In some cases， this involves reviewing thousands of accounts over a 
number of years. 121 This provision has long outlived its usefulness. 
Section 44 of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance abolishes the eight 
per cent limitation， and substitutes new s. 71 (1) which provides that interest is 
provable up to the time ofthe commencement ofthe bankruptcy. New s.71 (2) 
and (3) incIudes guidelines regarding the payment ofinterest out ofthe surplus 
remaining after the payment ofprovable debts. It sets the rate ofinterest at the 
higher of judgment rate or the contractual rate. Finally， new subs. (4) applies to 
debts for which interest is not reserved or agreed for， and which are overdue at 
the commencement of the bankruptcy. In such cases， interest may be cIaimed 
at the judgment rate from the time the debt was payable up to the date of the 
commencement of the bankruptcy. 
Tied to the abolition of the eight per cent limitation is the enactment of new 
s. 7lA of the Bankruptcy Ordinance， which is modelled on the extortionate 
credit transactions provision of s. 343 of the UK  Insolvency Act 1986. This 
provlslOn provides that on the application of the trustee， the court is 
empowered to make an order with regard to extortionate credit transactions 
entered into within three years of the commencement of the bankruptcy. 
Jl7. Ibid.， paras 18.2 and 18.4-18.5， atp. 179. P岨ra.19.1， at p. 182. 
118. S肘 Bankruptcy(Amendment) Ordinance， s. 21. 120. Ibid.， para. 19.4， at p. 183. 
119. Report on Bankruptcy， op. cit.， n. 5， 121. Ibid.， p岨ra.19.6， atp. 184. 
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Similar amendments were made to the Companies Ordinance for appli-
cation in liquidations.122 These sets of amendments will greatly simplify the 
duties of trustees and liquidators， and improve the efficiency of insolvency 
proceedings. 
XVII. Avoidance powers 
A major weakness of the old bankruptcy law is the ineffectiveness of many of 
the trustee's avoidance powers， namely the fraudulent preference provisions of 
old s.49 and the avoidance of settlement provisions of old s. 47. Old s.49 
enables a trustee to avoid as a fraudulent preference， inter alia， any payment or 
transfer of property by a debtor to his creditor that is made (a) with the 
“dominant intention" to prefer the creditor， (b) within six months ofthe filing 
of the bankruptcy petition， and (c) when the debtor is unable to pay his debts 
as they became due. Moreover， a payment or transfer made by a debtor under 
the fear oflegal process or as the consequence ofthe pressure ofa creditor is not 
considered voluntarily made and， therefore， may not be avoided as a fraudu-
lent preference.123 The focus on the voluntary nature of the debtor's act and 
therefore on the debtor's state of mind in making a transfer or payment means 
that the section often proves ine百ectivein making recoveries from creditors. 
Former s. 47 has proved even les useful.I24 This section enables trustees to 
avoid certain settlements that the debtor has made within 10 years of the 
debtor's bankruptcy. The provision su百ersfrom many problems. For example， 
some of the exemptions are archaic. Moreover， the most frequently used 
defence to the trustee's attempt to avoid a settlement一thatthe settlement was 
“made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable 
consideration" -has the potential for leading to litigation over whether there 
was “valuable consideration". 
Section 36 of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance abolishes these 
sections and replaces them with new enactments based on s 339 to 342 and 435 
of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. New s.49 allows the trustee to challenge 
transactions at an undervalue and s.50， unfair preferences. New s.51(1)， in 
turn， sets forth the time requirements for the application of these sections: five 
years from thc day the bankruptcy petition is filed for a transaction at an 
undervalue; six months for an unfair preference to a person who is not an 
“associate" of the debtor; and two years for an unfair preference to a person 
who is an “associate" of the debtor.“Associate" is defined in new s. 51 B. 
Section 51A focuses on the orders that may be made under new s 49 and 50. 
122. See s.43 of the Companies (Amendment) 
Ordinance (Ord.No.3 of 1997， LHK)， which 
came into operation in February 1997. This 
section adds new s 264A (interest on debts) 
and 264B (extortionate credit transactions) to 
the Companies Ordinance. 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6: 183-209 (1997) 
123. See Shart v Jackson [1899] AC 419. 
124. The same may be said of old s.31 of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance， which applies to 
fraudulent settlements. This section has been 
repealed by s.22 of the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Ordinance. 
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For unfair preferences， new s.50(4) replaces the dominant “intention to 
prefer" test with a requirでmentthat the debtor is influenced by a “desire" to 
put a creditor into an advantageous position. New s. 50(5)， in turn， provides 
that an unfair preference by a debtor to an associate (otherwise than by reason 
only ofbeing the debtor's employee) is presumed， unless the contrary is shown， 
to have been influenced by the debtor's desire to put the associate in an 
advantageous position. New s. 51 (2) also requires that for an unfair preference 
to be avoided， the debtor must be insolvent at the time of the transfer or 
become insolvent as a consequence of the preference. 
Pursuant to s. 49， a transaction at an undervalue may involve a gift， a trans-
action in consideration of marriage， or a transaction in which the transferee's 
consideration is“significantly less" than the value of the debtor's consideration. 
The requirements of s. 51 (2) are more complicated as applied to transactions at 
an undervalue. The insolvency of a debtor is only relevant for transactions at 
an undervalue made between two and five years of the commencement of the 
bankruptcy and， in cases involving an associate (otherwise than by reason only 
of being the debtor's employee) within that period， the debtor is presumed to 
have been insolvent at the time of the transaction. 
The new avoidance provisions improve upon the old law， especially in regard 
to transactIons involving associates， but they certainly are not simpler to grasp. 
As has been noted about the UK  equivalents， these provisions“are of 
Byzantine complexity" .125 The new preference provisions are broader in scope 
than the old provisions -the new test of a “desire" to put a creditor in an 
advantageous position is easier to satisfy than that requmng a “dominant 
intention" to prefer.126 Arguably， however， the provisions do not go far enough. 
It would have been better for the legislation to have dropped the "desire" test 
and to have focused primarily on the effect of the transaction in question and 
on preventing “last minute grabs" by creditors.127 
An important benefit of these strengthened avoidance powers is that they 
will probably lead to increased recoveries in many cases and thereby increase 
participation by creditors in the bankruptcy process. 
XVIII. Conclusion 
Although these changes to Hong Kong bankruptcy law were enacted in an 
amending Ordinance， in essence they almost completely overhaul the 
bankruptcy process. The nineteenth century nature of the former legislation 
125. Sealy and Milman， op. cit.， n.56， atp.402: 
general note to s. 339 of the UK Insolvency 
Act 1986 
126. UnfortunateJy， however， it appears that a 
creditor's p町 田urefor payment may continue 
to overcome the voluntary natu町 ofthe 
debtor's action and thus， insome cases， 
。197John Wiley & Sons， Ltd. 
overcome the debtor's desire to prefer. Se 
ibid.， atp. 291: general note to s.239 of the 
UK Insolvency Act 1986. It appears， there-
fore， that new s. 50 wil prove most useful in 
atacking preferences given to asociates of the 
debtor. 
127. Se， e.g.， US Bankruptcy Code， s.547. 
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has given way to a modern， progressive twentieth century substitute that better 
reflects， and will better regulate， existing commercial and social practices. 
Archaic notions such as acts of bankruptcy and reputed ownership have been 
abolished. A regime premised on wrongdoing by the debtor， on stigmatising 
the debtor， and on making it difficult， ifnot impossible， for many debtors to be 
discharged， has been transformed into a regime that acknowledges that many 
bankrupts are not morally blameworthy and that a discharge should be more 
of a right than a privilege. 
Other trends are evident in the numerous changes to the law. Many of the 
attempts to modernise the law have also .led to streamlining and simplifying the 
bankruptcy process. For example， the two-step procedure -based on a 
recelvmg order and an adjudication order一hasbeen replaced with a one-
step bankruptcy order. (Changes such as these also bring the bankruptcy 
ordinance into sync with existing procedures for corporate insolvency.) The 
doctrine of relation back has been abolished， unliquidated tort claims will be 
admitted， the interest on debt rules have been improved， and many unneces-
sary hurdles for the 0伍cialReceiver， trustees， and creditors have been 
removed. There are exceptions， of course. Although the new avoidance powers 
improve upon the old provisions， their statutory language certainly does not 
appear any simpler to parse. 
With the streamlining will come savings in costs， from which the unsecured 
creditors will benefit. Unsecured creditors wiU also benefit from the new avoid-
ance powers， the voluntary arrangement procedure， the new jurisdictional 
criteria， many of the changes regarding proofs of debt， and the decrease in the 
statutory deposit. Other changes will prove attractive to debtors， such as the 
automatic discharge， the liberalised exemptions， the ability to remain in the 
family home for between six and 12 months， the ability to retain legal 
representation at a public examination， and the doubling of the minimum 
debt. Overall， the new enactments do a much better job of balancing the 
interests of debtors and unsecured creditors. It is unfortunate， however， that 
secured creditors will remain able， for the most part， tocontinue to act outside 
the bankruptcy process. 
Although many of the reforms strike a reasonable balance between the 
O伍cialReceiver and the unsecured creditors， a few significant changes 
unfortunatel y 
Int. Insolv. Rev.， Vol. 6 ・ 183~209 (1997) 。1997John Wiley & Sons， Ltd 
Bankruptry Law Reform in Hong Kong 209 
1 t issignificant that these changes to the law will probably come into 
operation shortly after the transfer ofHong Kong's sove陀 igntyto China. Some 
amendments， such as retaining a petitioning ground that is based on the 
absconding of a debtor and increasing the time period for some of the juris-
dictional criteria， are fitting solutions to problems related to the hand-over. 
Other changes， however， such as increasing the role played by the 0伍cial
Receiver， are misguided. 
The legislation could also be improved in a few other areas. For example， the 
jurisdictional criteria should include a criterion based on the presence of assets 
in Hong Kong; the trustee's avoidance powers should be further improved; the 
stay should be extended to secured creditors; there should be monetary limits 
for the bankrupt's exempt property and the exemption provisions should 
include more detailed guidelines; a more comprehensive procedu児島rvaluing 
unliquidated claims should be included; and the provision enabling the court 
to order the Commissioner of lnland Revenue to produce tax documents 
should be applicable to the public examination of a bankrupt. 
These shortcomings， however， must be kept in the proper perspective. 
Overall， the enactment ofthe Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance is a major 
development that will greatly improve Hong Kong bankruptcy law. Many of 
the changes are long overdue. lndeed， itis ironic that the change in Hong 
Kong's sovereignty appears to have been the impetus for the Government to 
focus on the need to reform Hong Kong bankruptcy law and to enact a more 
modern statute. 
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